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Abstract 
In this paper we replicate and extend the experiment of Fehr and Gaechter (2000) that 
analyzes the effect of an opportunity to punish others on the level contributions in the Voluntary 
Contributions Mechanism. The punishment is costly for both the players distributing and those 
receiving the punishment. Like Fehr and Gaechter, we find that agents often engage in non-
credible costly punishment behavior in order to reduce earnings of others who contribute low 
amounts to the public good. The availability of punishment increases average contributions 
sharply. Here, we also introduce a second treatment, identical to the first treatment, except that 
the “punishment” is non-monetary. The assignment of “non-monetary” punishment points does 
not reduce the payoff of any agent, but it can be used to register disapproval of others’ 
contribution levels. We find that the existence of the possibility of “non-monetary” punishment 
alone increases the average level of contributions and earnings, though by less than the monetary 
punishment. This suggests that the increase in cooperation observed by Fehr and Gaechter is not 
only due to the possibility of monetary penalties, but also from the opportunity of others to 
express their disapproval of free riding behavior. 
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1. Introduction 
One of the most widely studied games in experimental economics is the 
Voluntary Contributions Mechanism. In this game, each agent receives an initial 
endowment of money. He can contribute any fraction of the endowment to a group 
account and keep the remaining fraction for himself. Each agent makes his contribution 
decision simultaneously. All funds in the group account pay a positive return to each 
member of the group. In the game, there is a dominant strategy for each agent to 
contribute nothing to the group account. However, the group optimum, assuming that the 
marginal per-capita return (the per-capita marginal benefit from additional contribution) 
is sufficiently high, is for every agent to contribute all of his endowment to the group 
account. The game receives wide attention in part because it starkly isolates the conflict 
between self-interest and group interest. This conflict is at the core of many situations in 
economics, such as the effects of negative externalities, defection from cartels, and team 
incentive problems, where strategic behavior can adversely affect group welfare. 
However, the main context in which previous researchers have viewed the voluntary 
contribution game is the private provision of public goods, where private incentives 
typically lead to a level of provision below the optimum. Contributing money into the 
group account constitutes the provision of a public good.1
 The experimental evidence obtained to date shows that when agents play the 
game repeatedly, there is initially a positive level of contribution to the group account. 
This result stands in sharp contrast to the prediction of non-cooperative game theory, 
which is zero contribution.2 The level of contribution declines with repetition (Isaac et al. 
                                                          
1 An interesting experimental literature has focused on public goods with the property that a threshold level 
of total contribution is required for the public good to be provided. Under that production technology the 
Voluntary Contributions Mechanism typically has multiple Nash equilibria. Here we confine our attention 
to public goods with a linear production technology to enable comparisons between our work and the work 
of Fehr and Gaechter (2000) that we build on with this project. Linear production, also has the advantage 
that self-interested and group-interested behavior can be more clearly distinguished from each other.  
2 This cooperation has been attributed to other-regarding behavior as well as to decision error. Various 
researchers have used experiments to uncover the nature of the postulated other-regarding behavior. The 
existence of players who are conditional cooperators, that is who reciprocate high (low) contributions by 
others with high (low) contributions of their own (Fischbacher, Gaechter, and Fehr, 2000; Sonnemans, 
Schram, and Offerman, 1996; Keser and van Winden, 2000) has been identified. The existence of a warm 
glow effect, in which agents receive utility from the act of contributing, has been identified by Palfrey and 
Prisbrey (1997). Anderson, Goeree and Holt (1998) find that pure altruism, a preference for others to have 
a higher payoff, is one of the factors that account for contributions. Bolton et al. (2000) interpret their data 
as supporting the presence of non-linear distributive preferences.  
2 
1985, Andreoni, 1988; Weimann, 1994; Keser, 1996) and readily responds to changes in 
treatment variables.3 For example, as the marginal per-capita return increases (Isaac and 
Walker, 1988b) or if communication between the parties is allowed (Dawes et al, 1977; 
Marwell and Ames, 1981; Isaac and Walker, 1988a, Ostrom et al, 1992), contribution 
rates increase. See Ledyard (1993) for a survey and interpretation of previous research in 
the area.4
In a recent paper, Fehr and Gaechter (2000), hereafter FG, consider how the level 
of contribution responds to the availability of an option for individual agents to punish 
other agents after they have observed their decisions. They study the following two-stage 
game. In the first stage, four subjects played the voluntary contributions game described 
above. In the second stage, each subject, after observing each of the other group 
members’ contribution, has an opportunity to reduce the payoffs of any or all of the other 
players in his group, at a cost to himself. Players can assign punishment points, which 
must be paid for from the earnings of the punisher. Each point received by a player 
reduces his payoff from the first stage of the game by 10 percent.  
FG’s design varies two factors. One factor is the matching protocol, which takes 
on one of two levels: partner and stranger. In the Partner matching protocol, agents are 
repeatedly grouped with the same agents, and in the Stranger protocol, agents are 
randomly grouped with other agents rendering the probability of being matched with the 
same agents in any two consecutive periods very low. In some sessions, ten periods with 
                                                                                                                                                                             
The decrease in contributions over time is suggestive of a reduction of the incidence of errors in 
decision-making over time that typically occurs in economic experiments. If the optimal decision is zero 
contribution, which is at the boundary of the strategy space, the only way confusion and errors can appear 
in the data is in the form of more cooperation than predicted.  Palfrey and Prisbrey (1996) argue that 
decision error is the main cause of the observed contributions. The role of confusion was studied by 
Andreoni (1996), who finds that both confusion and intentional contributions are present. (Also see 
Anderson et al., 1998 and Laury et al., 1999). The contribution rate is also higher than that predicted by 
non-cooperative game theory when the theoretical prediction is a positive level of contribution (Sefton and 
Steinberg, 1996; Keser, 1996; Laury et al. 1999).  
3 Marwell and Ames (1981) studied one-shot Voluntary Contribution games and found that agents 
contributed on average a substantial percentage of their endowment (between 20 and 84 percent, depending 
on the treatment). 
4  Contribution levels can also be influenced by factors, which are not addressed in traditional economic 
models. Framing the decision to contribute as inducing a positive externality or as reducing a negative 
externality influences contribution levels (Andreoni, 1995). The gender of members of the group has 
complex and subtle effect on contribution (Brown-Kruse and Hummels, 1993).  Isaac, Walker and 
Williams (1994) studied contribution levels in very large groups, and obtained mixed results. A lack of 
anonymity on the part of the subjects does not account for the higher than predicted contribution rate 
(Laury et al., 1995). 
3 
the punishment phase precede ten periods in which no punishment was possible. In the 
remainder of the sessions, ten periods of no-punishment precede ten periods with the 
punishment opportunity. 
The results of FG’s experiment are striking. In the one-shot conditions present (or 
approximated) in the stranger treatment, engaging in punishment behavior during the 
second stage of the game is inconsistent with subgame perfection, since such punishment 
is costly to the punisher, and thus not credible. By backward induction, the best response 
in the first stage is to contribute zero to the group account. The same is true in the only 
subgame perfect equilibrium of the finitely repeated partner treatment. However, under 
all three matching protocols, they observe that agents exhibit a willingness to punish 
other members of their group who contributed less than the group average. They also find 
that the availability of the punishment opportunity increases cooperation markedly. For 
example, under the partner treatment, in sessions where the ten periods of “no 
punishment” precede ten periods of “punishment”, the mean contribution is 37.5% of the 
initial endowment in the first ten periods, and 85% in the subsequent ten periods. In 
period 10, the average contribution is 16% of the initial endowment, but by period 20, it 
rises to 91%.5  
There are at least two possible explanations for the increased level of contribution 
engendered by the presence of the punishment opportunity. The explanations are not 
mutually exclusive nor are they exhaustive. The first potential explanation is that agents 
realize, particularly after they have received some punishment points, that a failure to 
contribute a sufficient amount will result in a reduced monetary payoff from punishment 
points received, so that free-riding is not profitable. Therefore, subjects contribute more 
to avoid paying monetary penalties in the current and (in the partner treatment) in future 
                                                          
5 Sefton, Shupp and Walker (2000) conducted a related experiment in which FG’s results were replicated 
with different parameters. They also added two additional treatments, a Reward treatment and a Combined 
treatment. In their Reward treatment, agents could, at a cost to themselves, give bonus payments to other 
agents after observing their contributions. In their Combined treatment, agents could both reward and 
punish other agents. They found that the presence of both rewards and punishments was most effective in 
promoting cooperation.  
Yamagishi (1986) studied the effect of an exogenous sanctioning mechanism that punished only 
the lowest contributor. However, the sanctioning system itself had to be funded with voluntary 
contributions by group members. Yamagishi found that the sanctioning system was indeed funded, 
particularly by participants who indicated a low trust of other people on surveys. The existence of the 
system served to increase contribution levels.  
4 
periods. We will refer to this explanation, stated more precisely below, as the Direct 
Punishment Hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Direct Punishment Hypothesis: The possibility for agents to reduce the 
monetary payoff of others after observing their decisions increases contribution levels. 
 
A second possible explanation stems from the fact that the opportunity to assign 
points that indicate disapproval of other agents’ decisions in itself increases the level of 
contribution. There are at least three reasons to believe that this might be so. The first 
reason is that pre-play communication between agents is known to increase the level of 
contribution and, in a Partner treatment, the assignment of points serves as a type of pre-
play communication for future periods. Secondly, in the Partner treatment, the 
assignment of points can be viewed as indicating the level of disapproval of others’ 
decisions. This expression of a degree of disapproval might have a positive effect on the 
contributions of other members of the group, if it is believed that such disapproval will 
translate into lower future contributions. In other words, an agent who assigns points 
communicates a warning that he will contribute less in the future unless others increase 
their contribution level. An effect of this nature requires the repeated interaction of the 
Partner treatment, but does not require the points an agent receives to reduce his payoff 
directly. A third possibility is that the agent incurs a disutility from receiving an 
expression of disapproval. The agent increases his contribution to minimize the expected 
number of disapproval points received. This third effect does not require repeated play 
and thus would apply to both partner and stranger treatments. We use the term Indirect 
Punishment Hypothesis to collect and describe all of these potential effects. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Indirect Punishment Hypothesis: The existence of the ability to express 
disapproval of others’ decisions in itself increases cooperation. 
 
The experiment reported here is designed to study the extent that the Direct and 
Indirect Punishment Hypotheses explain the increase in cooperation that occurs when 
monetary punishment is allowed. In our first treatment, the Monetary Punishment (MP) 
treatment, we replicate the procedures of the Partner treatment in the experiment of FG, 
5 
and obtain similar results. We find that the existence of the punishment option increases 
the average contribution. Specifically, we find that an individual tends to contribute more 
the more he was punished in the previous period. Players are more likely to receive 
punishment points the further their contribution in the current periods is below the period 
average, and the more different his contribution is from the punisher. Both the direct and 
indirect punishment effects are consistent with the results.  
We also conduct sessions under a second treatment, the Non-Monetary 
Punishment Treatment, NP, which is exactly the same as MP, except for one difference. 
The points assigned to agents affect neither the earnings of the agent who distributes the 
points nor the agent to whom they are distributed. Subjects are informed at the beginning 
of the experiment that assigning points to another participant indicates a level of 
disapproval of that participant’s decision. In this treatment, the Indirect Punishment 
Effect would serve to increase cooperation. However, the Direct Punishment Effect 
cannot account for an increase in cooperation here because the payment of the agent 
receiving points is not reduced. In the data from our NP treatment, we also observe an 
increase in contributions, though not by as much as in the MP treatment. This indicates 
that part, but not all, of the increase in contributions in the MP treatment is due to the 
Direct Punishment effect and part is due to the Indirect Punishment Effect.  
We then compare the effects of non-monetary sanctions under Partner and under 
Stranger matching. Several previous studies have explored whether contribution rates are 
different between Partners or Strangers when no punishment points are available but have 
not reached a clear consensus. Andreoni (1988) and Palfrey and Prisbrey (1996) find that 
Strangers contribute more than Partners, while Croson (1996), Keser (1996) and Keser 
and van Winden (2000) find that Partners contribute more than Strangers, and Weimann 
(1994) find no difference. See Andreoni and Croson (2000) for a review and survey of 
previous work in the area. As discussed previously, some of the rationale for the 
hypothesized effect of the disapproval points on contributions requires repeated 
interaction. On the other hand, Falk et al. (2000), who study the same game as FG, find 
that the sanctioning pattern is similar under Partner and Stranger matching, and conclude 
that the main purpose of the sanctions is non-strategic. Comparing Partner versus 
Stranger allows us to identify how important repeated interaction is in generating an 
increase in contributions for non-monetary sanctions. As we report in section three, 
6 
contributions are lower in a treatment with non-monetary punishments and stranger 
matching (NS) than in the NP treatment.  
Finally, we turn our attention to whether the NP treatment behaves in a similar 
manner as the MP treatment in terms of other empirical patterns observed by FG at the 
individual level. The assignment of points under MP, NP and NS does exhibit some 
similar patterns. In all of the treatments, agents assign points to those who contribute less 
than the group average, as well as to those who contribute less than they do. The receipt 
of points also has a similar effect in all three treatments. The more points received by an 
agent, the more he contributes in the next period compared to the previous period. The 
fact that this effect occurs even in the NS treatment is especially striking to us. It 
indicates that agents increase their contribution if they receive expressions of disapproval 
from others even when there is no strategic rationale for doing so. The similar behavior of 
NP and NS is analogous to the results of Falk et al. (2000) for monetary sanctions. 
In section 2, the experimental environment is described. Section 3 discusses the 
procedures of the experiment.  The results of the study are presented in section 4, and 
section 5 contains our concluding remarks. 
 
2. The Experiment  
The experiment consisted of eleven sessions and each session consisted of 30 
periods.6 The 30 periods in each session were divided into three segments of 10 periods 
each.7 Seven of the sessions were conducted at Purdue University and the other four at 
the Groupe d’Analyse et de Theorie Economique (GATE), at the Universite Lumiere 
Lyon II, in Lyon, France.8 Some information about the sessions is presented in Table 1. 
                                                          
6 There was one exception. Sessions number 10 was terminated due to a software crash after period 15. 
7 At the beginning of each segment, subjects were given a copy of the instructions for the condition and the 
experimenter read them aloud. It was made common knowledge that each segment would last ten periods. 
However, they were not informed during the first or second segments that addition periods were to follow. 
8 A systematic comparison of behavior between the data at Purdue and at Lyon was not one the purposes of 
this study. The use of two locations is intended to test the robustness of the treatment effects we observe. In 
general, the evidence that rates of contribution differ in different countries is weak. Yamagishi (1988) 
found that American subjects cooperated more in the absence of a sanctioning system than did Japanese 
subjects. However, Brandts, Saijo, and Schram (1997) compared contribution rates in four countries, Japan, 
The Netherlands, Spain and the United States, and generally found no significant differences between the 
four countries, with Spain being borderline significantly different from the other three countries. Cason, 
Saijo, and Yamato (2000), who study a Hawk-Dove game with entry, documented differences between the 
behavior of American and Japanese subjects. In light of the diverse evidence on international differences, it 
7 
The first three columns indicate the number of subjects that took part in the session, the 
location and the treatment in effect in the session, MP, NP, and NS. The Matching 
Protocol columns indicate whether Partner or Stranger matching was in effect during 
each of the three ten period segments that made up each session.  
 
[Table 1: About Here] 
 
The subjects were recruited from undergraduate courses in business and 
economics at both universities. The experiments at Purdue were conducted in English, 
and the subjects were paid in US dollars. The experiments at GATE were conducted in 
French, and the subjects were paid in French francs. Some of the subjects had 
participated in previous experiments, but all of the subjects were inexperienced in this 
particular type of experiment. No subject participated in more than one session of this 
study. On average, a session lasted 90 minutes including initial training and payment of 
subjects. The experiment was computerized using the REGATE program developed at 
GATE. 
All interaction among the subjects was anonymous. The Partner matching 
protocol was in effect for the first 10 periods of each session, and for the entirety of eight 
of the eleven sessions. Under the Partner matching protocol, the computer network 
separated the subjects into groups of size four. Group assignments remained constant for 
the entire session. The computer terminals comprising a specific group were dispersed 
throughout the room, and subjects were randomly assigned to a group by their choice of 
computer terminal upon entering the room for the session. Under the Stranger matching 
protocol, which was in effect from period 11 on in three of the sessions, participants were 
re-matched each period in new groups of four in a predetermined manner. It was common 
information that each subject had a zero probability of being matched with any given 
other individual for two consecutive periods as well as ever being grouped again with the 
same three people.  
The 30 periods of each session were divided into three 10 period segments. In 
periods 1-10 and periods 21-30 of each session, there was no punishment available. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
is difficult to hypothesize about specific differences in behavior in our game between the American and the 
French subjects.  
8 
Activity in these periods proceeded as follows. At the beginning of each period, each 
agent was endowed with 20 Experimental Currency Units (ECU’s), with each ECU 
convertible to US dollars at 30 ECU = 1 dollar or to French francs at 5 ECU = 1 franc. 
Subjects simultaneously chose the portion of their endowment to contribute to a group 
account. The subjects made this contribution decision by using a scroll bar on their 
computer screen. Each ECU contributed to the group account yielded a payoff of 0.4 
ECU to each of the four members of the group. Each ECU not contributed by the subject 
was credited to the subject’s own earnings.9 Therefore, the earnings of individual  in a 
period equal  
i
∑
=
∗+−=
n
k
ki ccE
1
4.020   
where  is the contribution of player . ic i
Once all members of the group made their contribution decision for the period, 
the computer informed each subject of his initial endowment, his individual contribution, 
the total group contribution, and his individual earnings. The subjects then manually 
recorded this data on a separate record sheet. This allowed the subjects additional time to 
reflect on their decisions and created a backup copy of the data. When all of the subjects 
completed recording their results, the computer continued to the next period.10  
 
Monetary Punishment 
In periods 11-20 of the Monetary Punishment (MP) sessions, each period 
consisted of a two-stage game in which the first stage followed exactly the same rules as 
in periods 1-10. At the beginning of the second stage, subjects were informed of the 
contribution levels of each of the other members of their group. They could then assign 
zero to ten punishment points to each of the three other group members. Each point 
                                                          
9 These parameters were the same used by FG. At the group optimum, each member of the group 
contributes all 20 ECU, yielding a payoff of 32 ECU per person for the period. However, each individual 
has a dominant strategy to contribute zero to the group account. If each player follows his dominant 
strategy, each player receives a payoff of 20 ECU. 
10 The device of an unanticipated restart has been used by Andreoni (1988) and Croson (1996). They 
observed that contributions in the period immediately following the restart were on average greater than in 
the last period before the restart. They interpret this increase as providing evidence of strategic behavior 
being one cause of departures from the dominant strategy of no contribution. If contributions were due to 
error, then there should be less contribution in later periods, as errors can be expected to decline with 
repetition of the game, and this process would not be affected by restarting the game. 
9 
received by a subject from any other agent reduced the first stage earnings of the subject 
by 10%, with a maximum reduction of 100%. Subjects observed the total number of 
points assigned to them, but not how many each individual assigned to them. There was a 
cost to the agent assigning the points associated with each point allocated. The schedule 
of costs, denominated in ECU, is given in Table 2.11 Therefore subject i’s earnings equal 
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where  is the number of points assigned by i  to , and ikP k ( )ikPK  is the cost to i of 
assigning the points. 
 
[Table 2: About Here] 
 
Non-Monetary Punishment 
Periods 11-20 of the Non-Monetary Punishment and Non-Monetary Punishment 
Stranger (NP and NS) sessions followed identical rules to periods 11-20 of MP, except 
that under NP and NS, each point awarded to an agent had no effect on his final earnings 
and was costless to assign.  Each agent had the opportunity to allocate between zero and 
ten “disapproval” points to each group member. The points represent the level of 
disapproval of a subject's contribution to the project in the first stage. An allocation of ten 
points was to be assigned for the highest level of disapproval and zero points for the 
lowest level of disapproval. The points and their purpose were described to the subjects 
in the following language: 
 
“In this stage you have the opportunity to register your approval or disapproval 
of each other group member’s decision by distributing points. You can award a 
large number of points to any member of your group if you disapprove of his 
or her decision (10 points for the most disapproval, 0 points for the least 
disapproval.)” 
                                                          
11 The cost for agent i indicated in the table represented the cost of the sum of points assigned to j by any 
one agent. That is, letting  equal the points that i assigns to j, the table indicates ijP ( )ijPK , the cost of 
assigning the points to player j. The cost to i of assigning points to j and k, ( ) ( ) ( )ikijikij PKPKPPK +=+ . 
10 
Once all members of a group made their point allocation decision, the computer 
displayed the subject’s own initial endowment, own earnings from the first stage, own 
points received, own cost of points allocated (for MP), own overall earnings for both 
stages, all individuals’ contributions, and the total group contribution. The subjects 
recorded their period results on a separate record sheet before continuing on to the next 
period. Earnings were calculated in the same manner as when no punishment was in 
effect 
 
3. Results 
The mean individual contribution levels in the MP treatment are shown in Table 3.  In the 
first column, the group number is given. The mean individual contribution levels within 
each ten period segment are reported for the Purdue and GATE locations in columns 2-7. 
Figure 1 shows the time series of group contributions for each of the six groups that 
participated in MP at Purdue, and Figure 2 shows the analogous data at GATE. In the two 
figures, the bold lines indicate the average group contribution over all sessions in one 
location. 
 
[Table 3: About Here] 
 
Our findings correspond to those reported by FG. In all but two of the 12 groups, 
the mean contribution level increases when the monetary punishment is available in 
periods 11-20 over the level in periods 1-10 in which no punishment is available. Five of 
the 12 groups attain a contribution level close to the maximum possible of 80 in the later 
rounds of the second segment. On average, the subjects in periods 11-20 contribute 
almost twice as much as in periods 1-10. When the possibility of punishment is removed 
in periods 21-30, the contribution rates fall in a manner consistent with the differences 
obtained by FG, when punishment opportunities are available in the early periods, but not 
in the late periods.  
 
   [Figures 1 and 2: About Here] 
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Consider the following linear regression equation, 
  
       ( )103210 −∗+++= tDDtC jt ββββ           (1) 
 
where  denotes the time period in the experiment, ranging from 1-30,  is the total 
contribution of group 
t jtC
j  during period , and  is a dummy variable if some form of 
punishment is permitted in the period. 
t D
1β  measures the overall trend in contribution levels over time. Previous studies 
have documented that there is a tendency for contributions to decline over time, so that if 
the previous pattern appears in our data, 1β  would be negative. 2β  measures the effect of 
punishment on contribution, beyond the effect of the overall trend. A significantly 
positive 2β  is evidence that contributions increased when the punishment opportunity 
was available and decreased when it was no longer available. Finally, 3β  measures the 
trend within the ten periods in which a form of punishment is in effect. The variable 
 assumes a value equal to 1 in period 11, the first period in which punishment is 
possible. A significantly positive 
( 10−t )
3β  means that the rate of decay of contributions in the 
periods that punishment is possible is less than during the periods when punishment is not 
possible, and the rate of contributions may even increase over time ( )  if 13 ββ −> . 
 
[Table 4: About Here] 
 
The estimates of regression equation (1) for the monetary partner treatment are 
given in the column labeled MP of Table 4. The constant term is significant, indicating an 
initial level of contribution significantly greater than zero. 1β  is significantly less than 
zero in the Purdue data as well as in the pooled data from the two locations, illustrating a 
decline in the level of contribution over time.  The significantly positive 2β  terms in both 
locations and in the pooled data indicates that there was a significant jump in contribution 
levels relative to the overall trend when either form of punishment was introduced, and a 
decrease when it was removed. The 3β  term is also significant indicating that in addition 
12 
to the shift in the level of contributions caused by adding the punishment stage, there was 
also a shift in the rate of change in contribution level over time. All of the signs of the 
coefficients are consistent with the data reported by FG.  
These results affirm that subjects are willing to engage in costly punishment of 
their fellow group members even though it is not consistent with subgame perfection, and 
that this punishment opportunity causes a large increase in contribution levels.  If the 
Direct Punishment Hypothesis is the sole explanation for this increase in contribution 
levels, then we should observe the same contribution levels in the NP treatment as in a 
treatment where no type of sanction is available. If the Indirect Punishment Hypothesis is 
the full explanation, then there should be no difference between MP and NP. 
As reported in Result 1 below, the availability of non-monetary disapproval points 
also has a positive effect on the contribution levels. Nevertheless, contributions in periods 
11-20 of the NP sessions are significantly lower than in periods 11-20 of the MP sessions, 
which means that the both the Direct and Indirect Punishment Hypotheses are supported. 
The possibility of imposing Monetary Punishment does increase contribution levels, but 
the ability to express disapproval alone accounts for part of the increase. 
 
Result 1: The Direct and Indirect Punishment Hypotheses are both supported. The 
availability of non-monetary sanctions increases the contribution levels of subjects, 
although by an amount less than monetary sanctions do. The increase in 
contribution resulting from non-monetary sanctions is not as durable as the increase 
from monetary sanctions. 
 
Support for result 1: We first argue that the non-monetary sanction increased 
contribution levels. The mean individual contribution levels in the NP treatment are 
shown in Table 5.  Figure 3 shows the time series of group contributions for each group 
that participated in NP at Purdue, Figure 4 contains the data at GATE, and Figure 5 
shows the corresponding data for NS. The mean individual contribution rates in periods 
1-10 and 11-20 are 6.55 and 8.97 respectively in NP, out of a maximum possible 
individual contribution of 20. A t-statistic of 2.48 from a pooled variance t-test shows that 
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the two means are significantly different at the 5% level.12 The estimates of regression 
equation (1) for the non-monetary partner treatment is given in the column labeled NP of 
Table 4. 2β  is significantly positive which means that the availability of the non-
monetary punishment increased the average level of contribution. 
Though the non-monetary sanction has a similar effect on the level of contribution 
as the monetary sanction, the magnitude of the effect is not as large.  The mean individual 
contribution rates in periods 11-20 of MP and NP are 11.11 and 8.97 respectively.  The t-
statistic from a pooled variance t-test comparing these two mean contribution levels is 
3.60, allowing rejection of the hypothesis that the means are equal at the 1% level. The 
average contribution rates of the MP and NP treatments increase from a similar base. The 
average contribution rates of the no sanction condition preceding the MP and NP 
treatments are 6.02 and 6.55 respectively. A pooled variance t-test does not allow for the 
rejection of the hypothesis that the two means are different (t=0.58).   
 
[Figures 3, 4, 5 and Table 5: About Here] 
 
The effect of the non-monetary sanction on increasing cooperation is not as 
durable as the monetary sanction. The estimates of the 3β  term of regression equation (1) 
presented in Table 4 provide evidence. In the NP treatment, 3β  is not significantly 
negative for the pooled data, which means that the effectiveness of non-monetary 
punishment decayed at the same rate as no punishment, whereas in the MP treatment, the 
3β  term is significantly positive. This means that cooperation in the MP treatment 
increases over time relative to the trend, whereas it does not in NP.   
 
Result 2 compares the NP and NS13 treatment and reveals more cooperation under 
the Partner than under the Stranger matching rule.14 This is consistent with the 
                                                          
12 For all statistical tests, each observation is calculated as the average of all the cohorts within a treatment 
for a period.  This provides 30 observations for each treatment and 10 observations for each treatment 
segment.  
13 At first glance it may appear from the significantly positive 2β  in the NS treatment that the sanction 
increased the level of cooperation. However, the negative estimate of 3β  suggests that the increase is 
merely a restart effect. The increase from the change in treatment is 1.688, but the estimated decline 
14 
interpretation that some of the increase in contributions resulting from the non-monetary 
punishment points are a response to the use of the points as a pre-play communication, 
and more specifically as a warning of a decrease in future contributions.  
 
Result 2: In the non-monetary sanction treatments, contribution levels are greater 
under Partner than under Stranger matching. 
 
Support for result 2: The mean individual contribution rates in periods 11-20 of NP and 
NS are 8.97 and 4.97 respectively, and the average contribution in each period of each 
session of NS is shown in Figure 5. A Wilcoxon signed-rank test of the two sanction 
conditions provides a t-statistic of 2.80, and thus can reject the hypothesis at the 1% level 
that the distributions are the same. Because the average contribution level was not higher 
over the first 10 periods in NP than NS, the increase from the availability of punishment 
points was greater in NP than NS.   
 
In both MP and NP, average earnings increase when the punishment opportunity 
becomes available. The increase is immediate in NP, but there is an initial decrease in 
MP, due to the cost of punishment, before the increase occurs. Average earnings in the 
first five periods of NP are greater than in MP. In the last five periods, monetary sanction 
yields greater average earnings than non-monetary sanction.  Result 5 summarizes this 
finding. 
 
Result 3: Either type of sanction increases average earnings. In the first five periods 
that sanctions are available, the average earnings are greater in NP than MP. The 
opposite is true in the last five periods. After the sanction is no longer available, the 
average earnings decrease to a similar level in both MP and NP. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
relative to the trend is .391 per period, so that by period 20, cooperation is lower than it would have been if 
the data from period 1-10 had been extrapolated until period 20.  
14 A comparison between period 1-10 and 11-20 confounds two factors. Periods 1-10 had no punishment, 
but also had Partner matching. Periods 11-20 had punishment and Stranger matching. However, the fact 
that periods 1-10 were identical under MP, NP, and NS, facilitates comparison of the data from periods 11-
10 of all three treatments. 
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Support for result 3: The time series of average per period earnings in MP and NP are 
shown in Figure 6. The average earnings in periods 1-10 are 23.15 in MP and 23.53 in 
NP are not significantly different from each other. In periods 11-20 when the sanctions 
are available, the average per period earnings are 24.41 and 25.03 ECU in MP and NP 
respectively.  The mean earnings of periods 1-10 are significantly less than in periods 11-
20 at the 10% level for MP (t = 1.64) and 1% level for NP (t = 2.90).  In periods 11-15, 
the average earnings are 22.79 and 25.62 ECU per period for MP and NP respectively, a 
significant increase at the 1% level (t = 3.15) for NP and an insignificant decrease in MP. 
A pooled variance t-test rejects the hypothesis at the 1% level that the earnings are the 
same in the two treatments in periods 11-15 (t = 4.28). In periods 16-20, the average per-
period earnings in MP of 26.03 is significantly higher at the 1% level than 24.43 in NP (t 
= 4.76). The t-statistic from a pooled variance t-test comparing the average earnings for 
MP and NP in periods 16-20 to periods 1-10 are 7.53 and 3.15 respectively, and thus both 
treatments have significant increase in cooperation at the 1% level. In periods 21-30, 
earnings average 22.52 and 22.00 in MP and NP respectively, both significant decreases 
at the 1% level from the contribution rates in periods 11-20 (tMP = 2.50 and tNP = 7.29).   
 
[Figure 6: About Here] 
 
Results 4 and 5 concern the dynamics of the interaction of punishment points and 
cooperation at the individual level. Result 4 focuses on the manner in which points are 
assigned and identifies those factors that determine the number of points an individual 
agent receives. In their study, FG document a clear relationship between the negative 
deviations of an agent’s contribution in a period from the group average that period, to 
the points he receives that period. On the other hand Falk et al. (2000) find that agents 
give greater (monetary) sanctions, the greater the contributions of the punished subject 
deviate negatively from those of the punishing subject. Both FG and FFF find the same 
patterns in the Partner and their Stranger treatments. As we describe in result four, we 
observe patterns of point assignment consistent with both FG and FFF with both 
monetary and non-monetary sanctions, and in both our partner and our stranger 
treatments. Non-monetary punishment points are distributed in the same manner as 
monetary punishments. 
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Result 4: The level of both types of sanctions received by an individual is increasing 
in (a) the negative deviation of the contribution of the punished subject from the 
average level and (b) the negative deviation of the contribution of the punished 
subject from the punishing subject.  
 
Support for result 4: Table 6 contains the estimates from the following regression 
model: 
 
{ }( ) { }( ) { }( ) { }( )ccccccccP jjijjiij −+−+−+−+= ,0max,0max,0max,0max 43210 βββββ  
The 1β  coefficient can be interpreted as the effect of player j  contributing less than  on 
the amount of points that  assigns to
i
i j . 2β  is the effect of j contributing more than i . 
3β  and 4β  are the effects of j  contributing less and more than the overall average 
respectively. Both 1β  and 3β  are highly significant in MP in both locations. As in FFF, 
player i  sanctions j  more the greater the negative deviation of  contribution is from 
. However, there is an additional effect that  sanctions 
sj'
si' i j  more, the further below the 
group average is  contribution. Both of these effects also carry over to the NP 
treatment, where the two coefficients are also highly significant.   
sj'
 
[Table 6: About Here] 
 
In MP, the effect of a positive deviation of  contribution from , indicated 
by the positive estimate of 
sj' si'
2β  is to increase the amount that i  punishes j . However, the 
negative estimated 4β ,  punishes i j  less, the more that j  deviates positively from the 
group average. This means that agents who contributed low amounts are more likely to 
punish those who gave higher amounts than other players. A similar pattern is 
documented by FFF, who interpret this behavior as evidence of spiteful preferences. 
These are preferences for outcomes that give the punisher a greater share than the 
punished. These effects do not appear in the pooled data from NP as 2β  and 4β  are not 
significantly different from zero. This is also consistent with spiteful preferences. If 
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preferences are spiteful, they should disappear when the relative payoffs cannot be 
changed in favor of the punisher during the punishment phase, which is the case in the 
NP treatment.  
Result 5 considers whether the assignment of points had the effect for which it 
was presumably intended, to boost the contribution level of the agent receiving the points 
in the next period. We find that in all three treatments the assignment of points to an 
agent does on average increase the contribution level of the agent.   
 
Result 5: The difference in an individual’s contribution from period t to period t+1 
is positively related to the points the individual received in period t, for the MP, NP 
and NS treatments. 
 
Support for result 5: Figures 7-9 illustrate the relationship between the points an agent 
receives and the increase in contribution in the next period.  The horizontal axis provides 
ranges of punishment points received in period , and the vertical axis presents the 
average relative contribution level between period 
t
1+t  and period t , (the average of 
, where  is individual  contribution in period ). The number above the 
data bar in the graph corresponds to the number of observations within that range of 
punishment points received.  The figures show that in MP, agents who receive a positive 
number of points tend to increase their contribution, while those who receive zero tend to 
lower it. In NP and NS, agents who receive more than 15 points, an average of five from 
each person or 50% of the maximum possible, on average raise their contribution in the 
next period, while those who receive less than 15 points tend to lower it.  
t
i
t
i cc −+1 tic si' t
 
[Figures 7-9: About Here] 
 
The correlation coefficient for the points awarded in period  and the difference 
in contribution levels from period 
t
1+t  and period t  are 0.28 and 0.42 for periods 11-20 
of MP and NP treatments respectively.  Table 7 provides the estimates from the following 
regression model: 
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The 1β  coefficient is the effect of the aggregate amount of points received by 
player  from the other members of their group on the change in  contribution from 
one period to the next.  
i si'
2β  is the effect of the difference between individual  
contribution and the mean contribution level of their group in period t  on the change in 
 contribution from period  to period 
si'
si' t 1+t .   
 
[Table 7: About Here] 
 
The estimates in Table 7 show that this relationship between the points received 
and the change in contribution from one period to the next is not due to a spurious 
correlation between the negative deviation from the average level of contribution in 
period  and the change in contribution between periods t  and . There is a 
significant negative relation between the deviation from the average and the subsequent 
change in contribution. Those who make large contributions are more likely to lower 
them in the next period than those who make low contributions. However, even after this 
effect is accounted for, the quantity of points awarded has an additional impact.  
t 1+t
 
4. Discussion 
This study is an attempt to identify the mechanisms whereby the possibility of 
punishment increases cooperation within a well-known strategic situation in experimental 
economics, the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism. We have based our design on that 
of FG, who clearly documented that even when the threat to punish is not credible, the 
threat will often be carried out against those who contribute less than the amount viewed 
as appropriate. Agents know that the threat will be carried out and this leads to increases 
in contribution to levels much higher than if the punishment opportunity did not exist. 
The increases are so great that after a few periods earnings are higher than if the 
punishment opportunity were not available. We replicate all of these findings in our MP 
treatment. We also find that there is a positive relation between the points received in 
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period t and the change in contribution between periods t  and 1+t  (the more points an 
agent receives, the greater is his net increase in contribution next period). 
Furthermore, we find that all of the above patterns are also present when the 
points have neither monetary consequence for the agent who assigns them nor for the 
agent who receives them. Contribution levels are greater when a non-monetary 
punishment is available than when it is not; though they are still less than when monetary 
punishment is available. This indicates the existence of a substantial Direct Punishment 
Effect. Part of the reason contributions are relatively high in MP is because of the 
possibility that agents can reduce others earnings.  
However, the data also reveal that the Direct Punishment Effect is not the 
complete explanation for the high contributions in MP, and cooperation can sometimes 
be achieved purely by non-monetary sanctions. This indicates the existence of the 
Indirect Punishment Effect.  This can be interpreted as a form of peer pressure. In some 
groups this “peer-pressure” is a powerful mechanism for promoting cooperation, whereas 
in others it has little effect.  The fact that we observe considerable differences between 
groups suggests that there are sociological or demographic factors that correlate with the 
ability of non-monetary sanctions to increase cooperation. Identifying such factors is a 
research agenda that goes far beyond the current project, but would seem to be an 
intriguing area for future research. 
Within the non-monetary sanction treatments, the partner matching protocol has a 
greater cooperation level than that of the stranger matching protocol.  This is consistent 
with the view that the points can serve as cheap talk signaling future decreases in 
contribution levels if the free rider does not increase his cooperation soon. This might not 
be surprising to the reader. However, we observe also that the points are awarded in the 
same manner in the Stranger as in the Partner treatment, to those who contribute less than 
the group average. Furthermore, even in the Stranger treatment, agents tend to increase 
their contribution the more points that they receive. Showing disapproval is effective in 
boosting contributions but a failure to show it when it is available lowers cooperation.  
The issue of whether the overall level of contribution is higher in the NS treatment than it 
would be in a Stranger treatment without the availability of points of disapproval could 
be studied in future research. 
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The influence of the non-monetary disapproval points on outcomes in the NS 
requires a non-strategic explanation. Fehr and Gaechter (1998) postulate that emotions 
can make non-credible monetary punishments be viewed as credible, and thus increase 
contributions to avoid punishment. We find the activation of emotions a plausible 
explanation for the relationship between the number of points received in period t  and 
the change in contribution from period t  to 1+t . When faced with an expression of 
disapproval from a group of peers, emotions may be activated that induce an increase in 
contribution. When the peers pass up an opportunity to express their disapproval, other 
emotions are activated that cause a decrease in contribution.  
The net change in contribution between periods  and t 1+t  is greater (a) the 
greater is ccti −  and (b) the greater the number of non-monetary punishment points 
received.  This invites an analogy with the work of Kandel and Lazear (1992) on peer 
pressure. They distinguish between internal peer pressure in the form of guilt, and 
external peer pressure in the form of shame. The force of guilt causes an individual to 
incur disutility from causing harm to others.  This internal peer pressure might be 
important in leading those who contribute less than the average to increase their 
contribution levels more than others. Shame is a disutility that occurs when others 
identify you as an offender.  External peer pressure appears to be a factor that leads those 
who receive non-monetary sanctions to contribute more. The difference between a 
Stranger treatment with and without non-monetary punishment is that external peer 
pressure can be brought to bear. The experiment supports the assertion that external peer 
pressure can be a powerful force promoting cooperation. 
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Table 1: Characteristics of the Experimental Sessions 
Matching Protocol Session 
Number 
Number of 
Subjects Location Treatment Periods 1-10 Periods 11-20 Periods 21-30 
1 12 Purdue MP Partner Partner Partner 
2 12 Purdue MP Partner Partner Partner 
3 12 GATE MP Partner Partner Partner 
4 12 GATE MP Partner Partner Partner 
5 16 Purdue NP Partner Partner Partner 
6 8 Purdue NP Partner Partner Partner 
7 12 GATE NP Partner Partner Partner 
8 8 GATE NP Partner Partner Partner 
9 16 Purdue NS Partner Stranger Stranger 
10 16 Purdue NS Partner Stranger Periods 11-15 
N/A 
11 16 Purdue NS Partner Stranger Stranger 
 
 
Table 2: Levels of Punishment and Associated Costs for the Punishing Subject 
Punishment Points 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Cost of Punishment 0 1 2 4 6 9 12 16 20 25 30 
 
 
Table 3: Mean Individual Contribution Levels in the Monetary Sanction Treatment 
 Partner Purdue Monetary Sanction Partner GATE Monetary Sanction 
Groups No Sanction Periods 1-10 
Monetary Sanction 
Periods 11-20 
No Sanction 
Periods 21-30 
No Sanction 
Periods 1-10 
Monetary Sanction  
Periods 11-20 
No Sanction 
Periods 21-30 
4.20 2.73 1.50 6.63 18.83 10.63 1 
(3.74) (2.69) (2.12) (4.72) (2.83) (7.16) 
7.15 7.33 4.28 5.33 2.33 1.35 2 
(6.29) (4.69) (4.66) (4.96) (3.18) (1.59) 
9.68 15.89 7.05 5.50 12.68 5.25 3 
(8.01) (7.41) (8.78) (4.62) (3.45) (3.73) 
6.00 19.05 3.85 6.05 6.73 4.33 4 
(6.14) (3.19) (5.63) (6.30) (6.25) (5.42) 
4.20 9.28 0.75 7.20 9.48 6.63 5 
(5.76) (2.16) (1.98) (4.97) (4.34) (4.05) 
3.05 16.35 7.09 7.35 13.03 5.44 6 
(3.37) (5.62) (5.74) (4.82) (6.38) (6.13) 
Avg. 5.71 11.77 4.09 6.34 10.51 5.60 
Std. Dev. (6.13) (7.37) (5.63) (5.10) (6.94) (5.75) 
Standard Deviations are in parenthesis 
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Table 4: Contribution Regressions Results 
 Purdue GATE 
 MP NP MP NP 
26.191*** 28.007*** 27.562*** 34.927*** Constant (β0) 
(2.937) (2.761) (2.824) (2.000) 
-0.466*** -0.431*** -0.172 -0.880*** Period (β1) 
(0.157) (0.148) (0.151) (0.107) 
15.725*** 20.451*** 7.594* 15.184*** Sanction Dummy (β2) 
(5.348) (5.012) (5.128) (3.632) 
Period x Dummy (β3) 2.261*** 0.109 1.736** -1.500*** 
 (0.821) (0.772) (0.790) (0.560) 
R Square 0.389 0.289 0.203 0.405 
F Statistic 37.120 23.802 14.965 33.082 
Observations 179 180 180 150 
 Pooled Data  
 MP NP NS  
26.854*** 31.153*** 9.294***  Constant (β0) 
(2.058) (1.842) (0.348)  
-0.317*** -0.640*** -0.270***  Period (β1) 
(0.110) (0.099) (0.021)  
11.638*** 18.057*** 1.688***  Sanction Dummy (β2) 
(3.742) (3.344) (0.644)  
1.998*** -0.620 -0.391***  Period x Dummy (β3) 
(0.575) (0.515) (0.107)  
R Square 0.292 0.263 0.424  
F Statistic 48.759 38.699 72.127  
Observations 359 330 298  
*** 1% significance level, ** 5% significance level, * 10% significance level 
Standard Deviations are in parenthesis 
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Table 5: Mean Individual Contribution Levels in the Non-Monetary Sanction Treatment 
 Partner Purdue Non-Monetary Sanction Partner GATE Non-Monetary Sanction 
Groups No Sanction Periods 1-10 
Non-Monetary 
Sanction  
Periods 11-20 
No Sanction 
Periods 21-30 
No Sanction 
Periods 1-10 
Non-Monetary 
Sanction  
Periods 11-20 
No Sanction 
Periods 21-30 
3.98 10.90 3.30 7.08 7.70 5.33 1 
(4.37) (4.72) (3.35) (6.45) (7.14) (6.20) 
5.25 3.50 1.38 8.60 6.60 4.80 2 
(5.91) (3.75) (2.19) (5.09) (5.48) (5.07) 
6.05 7.25 5.68 7.08 5.63 3.30 3 
(4.68) (4.07) (6.05) (6.01) (5.52) (3.61) 
3.85 17.68 3.55 6.20 5.83 2.10 4 
(4.12) (5.15) (6.26) (4.78) (3.67) (2.48) 
5.95 10.15 2.30 6.38 9.55 2.35 5 
(5.53) (8.51) (3.81) (4.68) (4.22) (2.59) 
11.60 13.90 4.79    6 
(6.49) (6.98) (7.84)    
Avg. 6.11 10.56 3.50 7.07 7.06 3.58 
Std. Dev. (5.81) (7.30) (6.06) (5.46) (4.17) (4.39) 
Standard Deviations are in parenthesis 
 
Table 6: The Relation of Sanctioning Behavior to Contribution Levels 
 Purdue GATE 
 MP NP MP NP 
0.019 1.554** 0.053 3.239** Constant (β0) 
(0.029) (0.197) (0.038) (0.216) 
0.039** 0.244** 0.076** 0.166** Negative Deviation from i’s 
Own Contribution (β1) (0.001) (0.043) (0.011) (0.047) 
0.030** 0.165** 0.046** -0.098** Positive Deviation from i’s 
Own Contribution (β2) (0.009) (0.032) (0.013) (0.034) 
Negative Deviation from 
Average (β3) 
0.111** 
(.0161) 
0.368** 
(.0669) 
0.368** 
(.0669) 
0.676** 
(.0767) 
Positive Deviation from 
Average (β4) 
-0.013 
(0.015) 
-0.247** 
(0.062) 
-0.247** 
(0.062) 
0.001* 
(0.002) 
R Squared 0.36 0.41 0.27 0.39 
 Pooled Data  
 MP NP NS  
0.046* 2.267 4.99  Constant (β0) 
(0.024) (0.145) (0.179)  
0.059** 0.209** 0.144  Negative Deviation from i’s 
Own Contribution (β1) (0.008) (0.034) (0.032)  
0.037** 0.002 -0.066  Positive Deviation from i’s 
Own Contribution (β2) (0.008) (0.022) (0.053)  
0.099** 0.507** 0.318  Negative Deviation from   
Average (β3) (0.012) (0.053) (0.067)  
-0.027* -0.000 -0.231  Positive Deviation from 
Average (β4) (0.013) (0.002) (0.076)  
R Squared 0.29 0.35 0.21  
*** 1% significance level, ** 5% significance level, * 10% significance level 
Standard Deviations are in parenthesis 
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Table 7: Effect of Negative Deviation and Points Received on Change in Contribution 
Dependent variable: the difference in contribution between periods t and t+1 
 Monetary 
Partner 
Non-Monetary 
Partner 
Non-Monetary 
Stranger 
Constant (β0) -1.241*** -3.245*** -4.306*** 
 (0.272) (0.422) (0.636) 
Points (β1) 0.123 0.189*** 0.156*** 
 (0.172) (0.037) (0.037) 
-0.723*** -0.506*** -0.851*** Deviation from the 
Average (β2) (0.133) (0.122) (0.148) 
R Square 0.116 0.224 0.182 
F Statistic 31.082 63.202 41.450 
Observations 476 440 376 
*** 1% significance level, ** 5% significance level, * 10% significance level 
Standard Deviations are in parenthesis 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Group Contribution Level for Each Monetary Sanction Cohort at Purdue 
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Figure 2: Group Contribution level for Each Monetary Sanction Cohort at GATE 
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Figure 3: Group Contribution Levels for Each Non-Monetary Sanction Cohort at Purdue 
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Figure 4: Group Contribution Levels for Each Non-Monetary Sanction Cohort at GATE 
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Figure 5: Group Contribution Level for Each Non-Monetary Stranger Session 
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Figure 6: Average Per Period Earnings in MP and NP 
15
17
19
21
23
25
27
29
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
Period
A
ve
ra
ge
 P
ay
of
f
Monetary Average Non-Monetary Average
Restart Restart
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Relative Contribution Between Period t+1 and Period t for Received Monetary Punishment 
Points in Period t of Partner Matching Protocol 
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Figure 8: Relative Contribution Between Period t+1 and Period t for Received Non-Monetary 
Punishment Points in Period t of Partner Matching Protocol 
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Figure 9: Relative Contribution Between Period t+1 and Period t for Received Non-Monetary 
Punishment Points in Period t of Stranger Matching Protocol 
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
0 [1,5] [6,10] [11,15] [16,20] [21,25] [26,30]
Non-Monetary Punishment Points Received in Period t
A
ve
ra
ge
 R
el
at
iv
e 
C
on
tr
ib
ut
io
n
23 36 29 46
96
29
85
 
31 
Instructions for Experiment 
 
General instructions (Monetary Punishment Treatment) 
You are now taking part in an economic experiment. If you read the following 
instructions carefully, you can, depending on your decisions and the decisions of others, 
earn a considerable amount of money. It is therefore very important that you read these 
instructions with care. 
 
The instructions we have distributed to you are solely for your private information. It is 
prohibited to communicate with the other participants during the experiment. 
Should you have any questions please ask us. If you violate this rule, we shall have to 
exclude you from the experiment and from all payments 
 
During the experiment your entire earnings will be calculated in ECU (Experimental 
Currency Units). At the end of the experiment the total amount of ECU you have earned 
will be converted to ECU at the following rate: 
 
30 ECU=$1 
 
Each participant receives a lump sum payment of ___ ECU at the beginning of the 
experiment. At the end of the experiment your entire earnings from the experiment will 
be immediately paid to you in cash. 
 
The experiment is divided into periods. In each period the participants are divided into 
groups of four. You will therefore be in a group with 3 other participants.  
 
Detailed instructions for periods 1-10 
 
At the beginning of each period each participant receives 20 ECU. In the following we 
call this his or her endowment. Your task is to decide how to use your endowment. You 
have to decide how many of the 20 ECU you want to contribute to a project and how 
many of them to keep for yourself. The consequences of your decision are explained in 
detail below. 
 
Your endowment in each period is 20 ECU. You have to decide how many ECU to 
contribute to the project by choosing a number between 0 and 20. After choosing your 
contribution you must press the ok button. Once you have done this, your decision can no 
longer be revised. 
 
After all members of your group have made their decision then your screen will show 
you the total amount of ECU contributed to the project by each of the four group 
members (including your contribution). This screen shows you how many ECU you have 
earned. 
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Your income consist of two parts: 
1) the ECU, which you have kept for yourself  
2) the income from the project = 40 percent of the total contribution of all 4 group 
members to the project (the total includes your own contribution) 
 
Your income in ECU in each period is therefore: 
(20-your contribution to the project)+0.4*(total contributions to the project) 
 
The income of each group member from the project is calculated in the same way, this 
means that each group member receives the same income from the project.  
 
For example, suppose the total of the contributions of all group members is 60 ECU. In 
this case each member of the group receives an income from the project of 0.4*60=24 
ECU. If the total contribution to the project is 9 ECU, then each member of the group 
receives an income of 0.4*9=3.6 ECU from the project. 
 
For each ECU that you keep for yourself you earn an income of 1 ECU. For every ECU 
you contribute to the project instead, the total contribution rises by one ECU. Your 
income from the project would rise by 0.4*1=0.4 ECU. However the income of the other 
group members would also rise by 0.4 ECU each, so that the total income of the group 
from the project would rise by 1.6 ECU. Your contribution to the project therefore also 
raises the income of the other group members. On the other hand you earn an income for 
each ECU contributed by the other members to the project. For each ECU contributed by 
any member you earn 0.4*1=0.4 ECU. 
 
To check your understanding of the experiment, please answer the following questions: 
1) Suppose each group member has an endowment of 20 ECU. Nobody (including 
yourself) contributes any ECU to the project. How high is: 
a) Your income for the period? _________ 
b) The income of the other group members for the period? _________ 
2)  Suppose each group member has an endowment of 20 ECU. You contribute 20 ECU 
to the project. All other group members contribute 20 ECU to the project. What is: 
a) Your income for the period? _________ 
b) The income of the other group members for the period? _________ 
3) Suppose each group member has an endowment of 20 ECU. The other three group 
members contribute a total of 30 ECU to the project. 
a) What is your income if you contribute 0 ECU to the project? _________ 
b) What is your income if you contribute 15 ECU to the project? _________ 
4) Suppose each group member has an endowment of 20 ECU. You contribute 8 ECU to 
the project. 
a) What is your income if the other group members together contribute a total of 7 
ECU to the project? _________ 
b) What is your income if the other group members together contribute a total of 22 
ECU to the project? _______ 
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Detailed instructions for periods 11-20 
 
Each period consists of two stages. In the first stage you have to decide how many ECU 
you would like to contribute to a project. In the second stage you are informed on the 
contributions of the three other group members to the project. You can decide whether or 
not to reduce their earnings from the first stage by distributing points to them. The 
following sections describe the activity in detail. 
 
The first stage 
 
The first stage is identical to the first ten periods. At the beginning of each period each 
participant receives 20 ECU. In the following we call this his or her endowment. Your 
task is to decide how to use your endowment. You have to decide how many of the 20 
ECU you want to contribute to a project and how many of them to keep for yourself. The 
consequences of your decision are explained in detail below. 
 
Your endowment in each period is 20 ECU. You have to decide how many ECU to 
contribute to the project by choosing a number between 0 and 20. After choosing your 
contribution you must press the ok button. Once you have done this, your decision can no 
longer be revised. 
 
After all members of your group have made their decision then your screen will show 
you the total amount of ECU contributed to the project by each of the four group 
members (including your contribution). This screen shows you how many ECU you have 
earned.  
 
Your income consists of two parts: 
1) the ECU which you have kept for yourself  
2) the income from the project = 40 percent of the total contribution of all 4 group 
members to the project (the total includes your own contribution) 
 
Your income in ECU in each period is therefore: 
(20-your contribution to the project)+0.4*(total contributions to the project) 
 
The income of each group member from the project is calculated in the same way, this 
means that each group member receives the same income from the project.  
 
For example, suppose the total of the contributions of all group members is 60 ECU. In 
this case each member of the group receives an income from the project of 0.4*60=24 
ECU. If the total contribution to the project is 9 ECU, then each member of the group 
receives an income of 0.4*9=3.6 ECU from the project. 
 
For each ECU that you keep for yourself you earn an income of 1 ECU. For every ECU 
you contribute to the project instead, the total contribution rises by one ECU. Your 
income from the project would rise by 0.4*1=0.4 ECU. However the income of the other 
group members would also rise by 0.4 ECU each, so that the total income of the group 
from the project would rise by 1.6 ECU. Your contribution to the project therefore also 
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raises the income of the other group members. On the other hand you earn an income for 
each ECU contributed by the other members to the project. For each ECU contributed by 
any member you earn 0.4*1=0.4 ECU. 
 
The second stage 
 
At the beginning of the second stage, your screen shows you how much each of your 
group members contributed to the project. In this stage you have the opportunity to 
reduce or leave equal the income of each group member by distributing points. You 
can award a large number of points to any member of your group if you disapprove 
of his or her decision (10 points for the most disapproval. 0 points for the least 
disapproval. Each point you distribute to a particular player lowers his or her 
payment by 10%.) 
 
The other group members can also reduce your income if they wish to. This is apparent 
from the input screen at the second stage. On the screen, you can see how much each 
group member contributed to the project at the first stage. Please recall that the same 
three people will be in your group for the entire experiment.  
 
You must decide how many points to give to each of the other three group members. If 
you do not wish to change the income of a specific group member then you must enter 0. 
If you distribute points, you have costs in ECU which depend on the amount of points 
you distribute. You can distribute between 0 and 10 points to each group member. The 
more points you give to any group member, the higher your costs. Your total costs are 
equal to the sum of the costs of distributing points to each of the other three group 
members. The following table illustrates the relation between distributed points to each 
group member and the cost of doing so in ECU. 
 
points 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
cost of these 
points 0 1 2 4 6 9 12 16 20 25 30 
 
Suppose for example that you give 2 points to one member. This costs you 2 ECU. If you 
give 9 points to another member this costs you an additional 25 ECU; and if you give the 
last group member 0 points this has no cost for you. In this case your total costs of 
distributing points would be 27 ECU (2+25+0). Your total cost of distributing points is 
displayed on the input screen. As long as you have not pressed the ok button you can 
revise your decision. 
 
If you choose 0 points for a particular group member, you do not change his or her 
income. However if you give a member 1 point (by choosing 1) you reduce his or her 
income by 10 percent, etc. The amount of points you distribute to each member 
determines therefore how much you reduce their income from the first stage. 
Whether or by how much the income from the first stage is totally reduced depends on 
the total of the received points. If somebody received a total of 3 points (from all other 
group members in this period) his or her income would be reduced by 30 percent. If 
somebody received a total of 4 points his or her income would be reduced by 40 percent. 
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If anybody receives 10 or more points their income from the first stage will be reduced 
by 100 percent. The income from the first stage for this member would in this case be 
reduced to zero. Your total income from the two stages is therefore calculated as follows: 
 
Your total payoff for the period (in ECU)  
 
If you receive less than 10 points: 
 
= [(income from the 1st stage)*(10-received points)/10]-cost to you of points you 
distribute 
 
If you receive 10 or more points: 
 
= - cost to you of points you distribute 
 
 
 
Please note that your income in ECU at the end of the second stage can be negative, if the 
costs of the points you distribute exceeds your income from the first stage. You can 
however avoid such losses with certainty through you own decisions by not distributing 
any points. 
 
After all participants have made their decisions, your income from the period will be 
displayed on your screen: 
 
To check your understanding of the experiment, please answer the following questions: 
 
5) Suppose in the second stage of a period, you distribute the following amounts of points 
to the other three group members: 9, 5, and 0. What is the total cost of the points you 
distribute? ________ 
6) What are your costs if you distribute a total of 0 points? ________ 
7) By how many percent will your income from the first stage be reduced, when you 
receive a total of 0 points from the other group members? ________ 
8) By how many percent will your income from the first stage be reduced, when you 
receive a total of 4 points from the other group members? ________ 
9) By how many percent will your income from the first stage be reduced, when you 
receive a total of 15 points from the other group members? ________ 
 
Detailed Instructions for periods 21-30 
In the next ten periods, each period will follow the same rules as periods 1-10. 
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General instructions (Non-monetary Punishment Partner) 
 
You are now taking part in an economic experiment. If you read the following 
instructions carefully, you can, depending on your decisions and the decisions of others, 
earn a considerable amount of money. It is therefore very important that you read these 
instructions with care. 
 
The instructions we have distributed to you are solely for your private information. It is 
prohibited to communicate with the other participants during the experiment. 
Should you have any questions please ask us. If you violate this rule, we shall have to 
exclude you from the experiment and from all payments 
 
During the experiment your entire earnings will be calculated in ECU (Experimental 
Currency Units). At the end of the experiment the total amount of ECU you have earned 
will be converted to ECU at the following rate: 
 
30 ECU=$1 
 
Each participant receives a lump sum payment of ___ ECU at the beginning of the 
experiment. At the end of the experiment your entire earnings from the experiment will 
be immediately paid to you in cash. 
 
The experiment is divided into periods. In each period the participants are divided into 
groups of four. You will therefore be in a group with 3 other participants.  
 
Detailed instructions for periods 1-10 
 
At the beginning of each period each participant receives 20 ECU. In the following we 
call this his or her endowment. Your task is to decide how to use your endowment. You 
have to decide how many of the 20 ECU you want to contribute to a project and how 
many of them to keep for yourself. The consequences of your decision are explained in 
detail below. 
 
Your endowment in each period is 20 ECU. You have to decide how many ECU to 
contribute to the project by choosing a number between 0 and 20. After choosing your 
contribution you must press the ok button. Once you have done this, your decision can no 
longer be revised. 
 
After all members of your group have made their decision then your screen will show 
you the total amount of ECU contributed to the project by each of the four group 
members (including your contribution). This screen shows you how many ECU you have 
earned. 
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Your income consist of two parts: 
1) the ECU, which you have kept for yourself  
2) the income from the project = 40 percent of the total contribution of all 4 group 
members to the project (the total includes your own contribution) 
 
Your income in ECU in each period is therefore: 
(20-your contribution to the project)+0.4*(total contributions to the project) 
 
The income of each group member from the project is calculated in the same way, this 
means that each group member receives the same income from the project.  
 
For example, suppose the total of the contributions of all group members is 60 ECU. In 
this case each member of the group receives an income from the project of 0.4*60=24 
ECU. If the total contribution to the project is 9 ECU, then each member of the group 
receives an income of 0.4*9=3.6 ECU from the project. 
 
For each ECU that you keep for yourself you earn an income of 1 ECU. For every ECU 
you contribute to the project instead, the total contribution rises by one ECU. Your 
income from the project would rise by 0.4*1=0.4 ECU. However the income of the other 
group members would also rise by 0.4 ECU each, so that the total income of the group 
from the project would rise by 1.6 ECU. Your contribution to the project therefore also 
raises the income of the other group members. On the other hand you earn an income for 
each ECU contributed by the other members to the project. For each ECU contributed by 
any member you earn 0.4*1=0.4 ECU. 
 
To check your understanding of the experiment, please answer the following questions: 
1)  Suppose each group member has an endowment of 20 ECU. Nobody (including 
yourself) contributes any ECU to the project. How high is: 
a)  Your income for the period? _________ 
b)  The income of the other group members for the period? _________ 
2)  Suppose each group member has an endowment of 20 ECU. You contribute 20 ECU 
to the project. All other group members contribute 20 ECU to the project. What is: 
a)  Your income for the period? _________ 
b)  The income of the other group members for the period? _________ 
3)  Suppose each group member has an endowment of 20 ECU. The other three group 
members contribute a total of 30 ECU to the project. 
a)  What is your income if you contribute 0 ECU to the project? _________ 
b)  What is your income if you contribute 15 ECU to the project? _________ 
4)  Suppose each group member has an endowment of 20 ECU. You contribute 8 ECU to 
the project. 
a)  What is your income if the other group members together contribute a total of 7 
ECU to the project? _________ 
b)  What is your income if the other group members together contribute a total of 22 
ECU to the project? _______ 
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Detailed instructions for periods 11-20  
 
Each period consists of two stages. In the first stage you have to decide how many ECU 
you would like to contribute to a project. In the second stage you are informed on the 
contributions of the three other group members to the project. You can decide whether or 
not to register disapproval of each other group member’s decision by distributing points 
to them. The following sections describe the activity in detail. 
 
The first stage 
 
The first stage is identical to the first ten periods. At the beginning of each period each 
participant receives 20 ECU. In the following we call this his or her endowment. Your 
task is to decide how to use your endowment. You have to decide how many of the 20 
ECU you want to contribute to a project and how many of them to keep for yourself. The 
consequences of your decision are explained in detail below. 
 
Your endowment in each period is 20 ECU. You have to decide how many ECU to 
contribute to the project by choosing a number between 0 and 20. After choosing your 
contribution you must press the ok button. Once you have done this, your decision can no 
longer be revised. 
 
After all members of your group have made their decision the your screen will show you 
the total amount of ECU contributed to the project by each of the four group members 
(including your contribution). This screen shows you how many ECU you have earned.   
 
Your income consists of two parts: 
1) the ECU, which you have kept for yourself  
2) the income from the project = 40 percent of the total contribution of all 4 group 
members to the project (the total includes your own contribution) 
 
Your income in ECU in each period is therefore: 
(20-your contribution to the project)+0.4*(total contributions to the project) 
 
The income of each group member from the project is calculated in the same way, this 
means that each group member receives the same income from the project.  
 
For example, suppose the total of the contributions of all group members is 60 ECU. In 
this case each member of the group receives an income from the project of 0.4*60=24 
ECU. If the total contribution to the project is 9 ECU, then each member of the group 
receives an income of 0.4*9=3.6 ECU from the project. 
 
For each ECU that you keep for yourself you earn an income of 1 ECU. For every ECU 
you contribute to the project instead, the total contribution rises by one ECU. Your 
income from the project would rise by 0.4*1=0.4 ECU. However the income of the other 
group members would also rise by 0.4 ECU each, so that the total income of the group 
from the project would rise by 1.6 ECU. Your contribution to the project therefore also 
raises the income of the other group members. On the other hand you earn an income for 
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each ECU contributed by the other members to the project. For each ECU contributed by 
any member you earn 0.4*1=0.4 ECU. 
 
The second stage 
 
At the beginning of the second stage, your screen shows you how much each of your 
group members contributed to the project. In this stage you have the opportunity to 
register your approval or disapproval of each other group member’s decision by 
distributing points. You can award a large number of points to any member of your 
group if you disapprove of his or her decision (10 points for the most disapproval. 0 
points for the least disapproval.) 
 
The other group members can also assign points to you if they wish to. This is apparent 
from the input screen at the second stage. On the screen, you can see how much each 
group member contributed to the project at the first stage. Please recall that the same 
three people will be in your group for the entire experiment.  
 
You must decide how many points to give to each of the other three group members. If 
you do not wish to register a disapproval of the decision of a specific group member then 
you must enter 0. 
 
After all participants have made their decisions, your income from the period will be 
displayed on your computer screen. 
 
Detailed Instructions for periods 21-30 
In the next ten periods, each period will follow the same rules as periods 1-10. 
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General instructions (Non-monetary Punishment Stranger) 
 
You are now taking part in an economic experiment. If you read the following 
instructions carefully, you can, depending on your decisions and the decisions of others, 
earn a considerable amount of money. It is therefore very important that you read these 
instructions with care. 
 
The instructions we have distributed to you are solely for your private information. It is 
prohibited to communicate with the other participants during the experiment. 
Should you have any questions please ask us. If you violate this rule, we shall have to 
exclude you from the experiment and from all payments 
 
During the experiment your entire earnings will be calculated in ECU (Experimental 
Currency Units). At the end of the experiment the total amount of ECU you have earned 
will be converted to ECU at the following rate: 
 
30 ECU=$1 
 
Each participant receives a lump sum payment of ___ ECU at the beginning of the 
experiment. At the end of the experiment your entire earnings from the experiment will 
be immediately paid to you in cash. 
 
The experiment is divided into periods. In each period the participants are divided into 
groups of four. You will therefore be in a group with 3 other participants.  
 
Detailed instructions for periods 1-10 
 
At the beginning of each period each participant receives 20 ECU. In the following we 
call this his or her endowment. Your task is to decide how to use your endowment. You 
have to decide how many of the 20 ECU you want to contribute to a project and how 
many of them to keep for yourself. The consequences of your decision are explained in 
detail below. 
 
Your endowment in each period is 20 ECU. You have to decide how many ECU to 
contribute to the project by choosing a number between 0 and 20. After choosing your 
contribution you must press the ok button. Once you have done this, your decision can no 
longer be revised. 
 
After all members of your group have made their decision then your screen will show 
you the total amount of ECU contributed to the project by each of the four group 
members (including your contribution). This screen shows you how many ECU you have 
earned. 
 
Your income consist of two parts: 
1) the ECU, which you have kept for yourself  
2) the income from the project = 40 percent of the total contribution of all 4 group 
members to the project (the total includes your own contribution) 
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Your income in ECU in each period is therefore: 
(20-your contribution to the project)+0.4*(total contributions to the project) 
 
The income of each group member from the project is calculated in the same way, this 
means that each group member receives the same income from the project.  
 
For example, suppose the total of the contributions of all group members is 60 ECU. In 
this case each member of the group receives an income from the project of 0.4*60=24 
ECU. If the total contribution to the project is 9 ECU, then each member of the group 
receives an income of 0.4*9=3.6 ECU from the project. 
 
For each ECU that you keep for yourself you earn an income of 1 ECU. For every ECU 
you contribute to the project instead, the total contribution rises by one ECU. Your 
income from the project would rise by 0.4*1=0.4 ECU. However the income of the other 
group members would also rise by 0.4 ECU each, so that the total income of the group 
from the project would rise by 1.6 ECU. Your contribution to the project therefore also 
raises the income of the other group members. On the other hand you earn an income for 
each ECU contributed by the other members to the project. For each ECU contributed by 
any member you earn 0.4*1=0.4 ECU. 
 
To check your understanding of the experiment, please answer the following questions: 
1)  Suppose each group member has an endowment of 20 ECU. Nobody (including 
yourself) contributes any ECU to the project. How high is: 
a)  Your income for the period? _________ 
b)  The income of the other group members for the period? _________ 
2)  Suppose each group member has an endowment of 20 ECU. You contribute 20 ECU 
to the project. All other group members contribute 20 ECU to the project. What is: 
a)  Your income for the period? _________ 
b)  The income of the other group members for the period? _________ 
3)  Suppose each group member has an endowment of 20 ECU. The other three group 
members contribute a total of 30 ECU to the project. 
a)  What is your income if you contribute 0 ECU to the project? _________ 
b)  What is your income if you contribute 15 ECU to the project? _________ 
4)  Suppose each group member has an endowment of 20 ECU. You contribute 8 ECU to 
the project. 
a)  What is your income if the other group members together contribute a total of 7 
ECU to the project? _________ 
b)  What is your income if the other group members together contribute a total of 22 
ECU to the project? _______ 
 
Detailed instructions for periods 11-20  
 
In each period, the participants are divided into groups of four. You will therefore be in a 
group with 3 other participants.  However, you will never be matched with the same 3 
participants in any 2 consecutive periods. The computer terminals throughout the room 
are numbered 1-16.  Each period, you will have a different computer assignment.  Your 
computer assignments are provided to you on the Computer Assignment Sheet within 
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your instruction packet.  At the end of each period, the experimenter will make an 
announcement to signal when to move to the computer assignment for the following 
period. 
 
Each period consists of two stages. In the first stage you have to decide how many ECU 
you would like to contribute to a project. In the second stage you are informed on the 
contributions of the three other group members to the project. You can decide whether or 
not to register disapproval of each other group member’s decision by distributing points 
to them.  The following sections describe the activity in detail. 
 
The first stage 
 
The first stage is identical to the first ten periods. At the beginning of each period each 
participant receives 20 ECU. In the following we call this his or her endowment. Your 
task is to decide how to use your endowment. You have to decide how many of the 20 
ECU you want to contribute to a project and how many of them to keep for yourself. The 
consequences of your decision are explained in detail below. 
 
Your endowment in each period is 20 ECU. You have to decide how many ECU to 
contribute to the project by choosing a number between 0 and 20. After choosing your 
contribution you must press the ok button. Once you have done this, your decision can no 
longer be revised. 
 
After all members of your group have made their decision the your screen will show you 
the total amount of ECU contributed to the project by each of the four group members 
(including your contribution). This screen shows you how many ECU you have earned.  
 
Your income consists of two parts: 
1) the ECU which you have kept for yourself  
2) the income from the project = 40 percent of the total contribution of all 4 group 
members to the project (the total includes your own contribution) 
 
Your income in ECU in each period is therefore: 
(20-your contribution to the project)+0.4*(total contributions to the project) 
 
The income of each group member from the project is calculated in the same way, this 
means that each group member receives the same income from the project.  
 
For example, suppose the total of the contributions of all group members is 60 ECU. In 
this case each member of the group receives an income from the project of 0.4*60=24 
ECU. If the total contribution to the project is 9 ECU, then each member of the group 
receives an income of 0.4*9=3.6 ECU from the project. 
 
For each ECU that you keep for yourself you earn an income of 1 ECU. For every ECU 
you contribute to the project instead, the total contribution rises by one ECU. Your 
income from the project would rise by 0.4*1=0.4 ECU. However the income of the other 
group members would also rise by 0.4 ECU each, so that the total income of the group 
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from the project would rise by 1.6 ECU. Your contribution to the project therefore also 
raises the income of the other group members. On the other hand you earn an income for 
each ECU contributed by the other members to the project. For each ECU contributed by 
any member you earn 0.4*1=0.4 ECU. 
 
The second stage 
 
At the beginning of the second stage, your screen shows you how much each of your 
group members contributed to the project. In this stage you have the opportunity to 
register your approval or disapproval of each other group member’s decision by 
distributing points. You can award a large number of points to any member of your 
group if you disapprove of his or her decision (10 points for the most disapproval. 0 
points for the least disapproval.) 
 
The other group members can also assign points to you if they wish to. This is apparent 
from the input screen at the second stage. On the screen, you can see how much each 
group member contributed to the project at the first stage.  
 
You must decide how many points to give to each of the other three group members. If 
you do not wish to register a disapproval of the decision of a specific group member then 
you must enter 0. 
 
After all participants have made their decisions, your income from the period will be 
displayed on your computer screen.  Record your period earnings on your record sheet. 
 
Detailed Instructions for periods 21-30 
 
In the next ten periods, each period will follow the same rules as periods 1-10. 
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